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SUMMARY 
The authors examine the logistic ecology of 30 large-scale networks that were active in hu-
man smuggling and trafficking from Albania and Bulgaria to Belgium (1995–2003). Ten networks 
were studied in greater detail in order to determine three final profiles of networks, based on their use 
of structural and operational intermediary structures. They are called the “individual infiltration” and 
the “structural infiltration” human smuggling patterns, and the “violent-control prostitution” trafficking 
pattern. It should be noted that the business is organized in such a way that the organizers of the lo-
gistical support are never inculpated.  
KEY WORDS: human smuggling, trafficking, intermediary structures 
Introduction 
In this paper we examine how 30 networks active in the human smuggling and 
trafficking business from Albania and Bulgaria to Belgium were organized between 
1995 and 2003. We focus on identifying the entrepreneur of each network, and the lo-
gistic environment constructed for each. We conclude by identifying three distinct mo-
dels of business organization.  
It is not at all our intention to suggest that each form of human smuggling and 
trafficking from Eastern to Western Europe is carried out in the way that we observed. 
Nor is it our intention to claim that this business should be seen as a model for the 
overall current patterns of irregular migration from Albania or Bulgaria to Western Eu-
rope. We do think, however, that the structure we discovered occurs frequently enough 
to be meaningful. Further, we wish to suggest that studying closed judiciary files can 
complement the analysis of current organized smuggling and trafficking from and via 
Albania and Bulgaria to the West.  
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Materials and research questions 
Between 1995 and 2003 we had access to 41 judiciary files concerned with human 
smuggling and trafficking from Albania and Bulgaria to Belgium. After some time we 
understood that some instances nearly always remained out of sight in the treatment of the 
files. This was due to the way the business was organized. As a consequence, we made an 
effort to study aspects of the system that are normally not examined by judges looking for 
guilty parties.  
Table 1: Human trafficking and/or smuggling (41 files) 
 Albania Bulgaria Total 
Trafficking 07 10 17 
Smuggling 09 01 10 
Combination 04 10 14 
 20 21 41 
In their business model for analyzing the irregular migration process, Salt and 
Stein have called attention to the fact that specific analyses can be made of the exit, 
transit and entry phases in the migration process (Salt and Stein, 1998). Van Amersfoort 
has emphasized that not only the phases but also the relations between the phases can 
be analyzed. For him, these are the social and economic structures that link the coun-
tries of provenance and of destination, and these may be called the intermediary struc-
tures (Van Amersfoort, 1998: 15). We make a distinction between structural and opera-
tional links. Structural links include the material tools that are used. Operational links 
designate mechanisms of influence that are used. 
The central research question is: who functions as the entrepreneur? The first 
complementary question then, is: what material tools are used by these entrepreneurs to 
support their businesses logistically? Material tools frequently identified in the litera-
ture include travel agencies, transport firms, and safe houses. Do the entrepreneurs of 
our research also use these tools? As a second complementary question we look for 
“patterns” in the business structure. The question of corruption, however, is not exa-
mined in this paper. A final remark will concern the judicial approach of the logistical 
ecology in this illegal business. Each time, we first make observations from the litera-
ture (which concerns a broader scope than only Albania and Bulgaria), and then we add 
our own findings from the study of our files. 
Who are the entrepreneurs in our large-scale files? 
In a report by a Belgian immigration officer about the situation in Albania, we 
find links between travel agencies and safe houses in human smuggling and trafficking, 
but also – in some cases – with (former) security services. Malevolent travel agencies 
cooperate with people who sell false documents, and with dubious attorneys. A number 
of former Albanian security agents have joined criminal organizations. They are active 
in human smuggling and trafficking and teach other network members the typical “in-
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telligence” techniques, for example, for internal secret communication within the crimi-
nal network (Belgian Ministry of Home Affairs, 2001). 
Some reports about Bulgaria describe how certain smuggling networks started 
up originally by “intelligence” services that have been taken over by organized criminal 
organizations (CSD, 2004). The war in the Balkans created an environment in which these 
illegal organizations flourished. Originally it was principally drugs and weapons that 
were smuggled, but eventually the criminal organizations also began to focus on human 
smuggling and trafficking, using the same trafficking routes and partners (CSD, 2004; 
Hajdinjak, 2002). Border and visa controls then entered into the field of corruption of 
criminal organizations that collaborated closely with former security agents (CSD, 2003). 
Former intelligence service members could activate their contacts with Western embas-
sies (which was important for easily obtaining visas), and they facilitated the access to 
hotels or other places of stay for the temporary housing of people in transit (Hajdinjak, 
2002). These activities could often be accompanied by the establishment of (collabo-
ration with) travel agencies in an Eastern European capital such as Sofia in the 1990s. 
Indeed, files clearly showed that some traffickers had previously worked for the 
intelligence services in their home countries. Some could operate on an individual basis 
and brought their know-how into the criminal network. However, in various files we 
observed a structural involvement of former security services that took with them a part 
of the infrastructure associated with their service, for example firms. They took over 
typical tasks of the authorities such as protection, now offered in their case by criminal 
networks. From the analysis of our 41 files it appears that in more than 25% of the 
cases, former intelligence personnel visibly played an important role in the activities of 
the criminal networks (Leman and Janssens, 2006). 
Table 2: Security services 
 Albania Bulgaria Total 
Security services 06 06 12 
No indication 14 15 29 
 20 21 41 
We saw in our files that where (former) intelligence personnel were active in the 
business, they usually opted for entrepreneurship. As entrepreneurs, they do indeed dis-
pose from their past with expertise in the 3 phases of the intermediary structure (i.e. 
exit, transit and entry). They have at their disposal in their country of origin a special 
know-how for the falsification of official documents. Sometimes they also have good 
contacts with diplomats or with people in their direct environment. In the transit coun-
try, they dispose of well-hidden and sometimes very anonymous social networks. They 
also have access to financial capital through fake firms in which they had invested 
during their previous work and, later, sending out State capital immediately after the 
implosion of the communist regimes. In the country of destination they can dispose of 
a business network or have good contacts. They are well infiltrated in a certain number 
of import-export firms. They know people in the travel agencies and transport firms. 
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We distinguish two profiles in the way the intelligence people are involved. In a 
first profile, their role remains limited to a partial putting at disposition of expertise and 
contacts. Individual former intelligence agents who have integrated into the criminal 
world and play a central role as entrepreneurs in the network, continue to use techni-
ques and expertise from their past. This is typical for our Albanian files. In a second 
profile, the criminal organizations can use the expertise, but also the existing infra-
structure of some former communist intelligence services from Eastern Europe. In that 
case we see a mixture of espionage and smuggling networking, that later also speciali-
zed in human smuggling and trafficking. In this second case, travel agencies and trans-
port firms are started up by former intelligence groups. This is typical for our Bulgarian 
files. In the Bulgarian case, it concerns parts of the former intelligence service that 
structurally takes over a business. In the Albanian case, we see rather individuals who 
previously were, but sometimes even still are, linked with “intelligence” agencies and 
offer their services. 
We call these entrepreneurs mala fide. Why?  
The notion of mala fide needs some explanation. We use a broad definition, in 
line with the interpretation of mala fide that is applied to commercial structures in ge-
neral in countries such as Belgium in the annual reports of the Ministry of Justice (Bel-
gian Ministry of Justice, 1999, 2000). A transport firm or travel agency is called mala 
fide when it is at least partially exploited by a criminal network. This could be a com-
pletely legally-established firm that is used by a criminal network with the systematic 
collaboration of one or more members in the firm, or even a phantom firm that func-
tions as a cover for a criminal organization. We call both mala fide firms, but of course 
there is an important distinction between the two, which we’ll indicate while describing 
the profiles. There are also bona fide firms which may be used occasionally from the 
outside by malevolent entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurship that we see at work in the 
typical well-structured large-scale illegal smuggling and trafficking of human beings 
from Albania and Bulgaria into Belgium is partly linked with a past in the (former) in-
telligence services. These former members have the expertise to start up firms that may 
be malevolent in various ways. This brings us to the logistic ecology of their business 
practices. 
The logistic ecology of the mala fide business 
The literature, also about countries other than Albania and Bulgaria, mentions 
how various material, logistical tools may be distinguished, for example travel agencies 
(Bruckert and Parent, 2002; Arnold and Doni, 2002; IAM, 2002; Florida State Univer-
sity, 2003; OSCE, 2002; Regan, 1997; Tudor, 2000; Hajdinjak, 2002; Limanowska, 
2002), bus companies (IAM, 2002; El-Cherkeh et al., 2004; Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2002; Van De Bunt and Van Der Schoot, 2003; Hughes and Denisova, 2002), and 
transport with trucks (IAM, 2002; Van De Bunt and Van Der Schoot, 2003; Common-
wealth Secretariat, 2002; Raymond, 2002; D’Cunha, 2002). Travel agencies and airline 
companies are explicitly called sectors at risk (Belgian Senate, 2003). Criminal organi-
zations invest their criminal benefits in transport firms, travel agencies and hotels (Ober-
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loher, 2004). In a number of situations, travel agencies and transport firms have also col-
laborated with employment agencies with malevolent objectives (UN, 2000b). Gene-
rally the managers of these travel agencies, transport firms and employment agencies 
have no criminal record (UN, 2000b; Massari, 2001; Ruggiero, 2003). Very often these 
firms simply try to maximalize their profits (Massari, 2001). The objective of the in-
sertion of such apparently bona fide firms was to make the tracing of the organizers of 
the smuggling more difficult (IAM, 2002). 
Table 3: Transport firms and travel agencies (41 files) 
 Albania Bulgaria Total 
Travel agency (a) 06 03 09 
Transport firm (b) 05 07 12 
Both (a) and (b)  01 02 03 
Neither (a) nor (b) 08 09 17 
 20 21 41 
The analysis in Table 3 seems to indicate that travel agencies and/or transport 
firms play an important role in more than half of cases. A criminal organization may 
use mala fide drivers in various transport firms, in which the management is not neces-
sarily aware of the drivers’ intentions or actions. In that scenario, the smuggling entre-
preneurs pay the drivers on an individual basis to smuggle their clients. None of the 
travel agencies are implicated and the transport firms may even be bona fide. Another 
possibility is that mala fide transport firms and/or travel agencies are under the control 
of a criminal organization that develops both legal and illegal activities. In that scenario, 
transport firms develop legal activities but may mix them with illegal ones. For exam-
ple, some travel agencies may organize cultural trips for tourists and may add some 
clients who simply want to be smuggled. A third profile concerns malevolent travel 
agencies in the hands of criminal organizations that focus mostly on illegal activities. 
They may, for example, exploit a bus company to transport victims for prostitution. But 
they may also offer a special course for future asylum seekers and create a network of 
solicitors to help them with these matters in the country of destination. 
Besides the use of travel agencies and transport firms, the literature also shows 
that in smuggling networks, safe houses are mostly linked with the transport in the inter-
mediary structuration. These safe houses are mostly situated in the transit phase (Savo-
na et al., 1996; Jandl, 2004). At particular places during the journey, the traffickers 
want total control of the movements of the smuggled people (KPLD, 2005; McCulloch, 
2000; Chin, 1999; Kwong, 2001; ICMPD, 1999). In such places of stay, various details 
might be handled by the managers of the local safe house (Savona et al., 1996; ICMPD, 
1999; Iselin, 2003): payments, for example, for parts of the trip (KPLD, 2005; ICMPD, 
1999; McCulloch, 2000; David, 2000; Chin, 1997, 1999; Kwong, 2001). The victims 
can be detained in the safe house until the payment has been made (Friebel and Guriev, 
2002, 2004; Bruckert and Parent, 2004). Pressure can be used from the safe house vis-
à-vis the family in the country of provenance; or illegal employment can become a tool 
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(KPLD, 2005; Bruckert and Parent, 2004). Shopkeepers can rent safe houses (Merrit, 
2003), and this may be a way to launder money and to organize contacts with legal com-
merce (IAM, 2002). Physical violence might be used in order to obtain more money 
(Graycar, 1999; KPLD, 2005; Chin, 1997; David, 2000; Skeldon, 2000; Charlton, 
2003). Safe houses can also be useful for dealing with false documents (IAM, 2002). 
Safe houses are clearly more than simply places to stay for the night during the trip 
(Leman and Janssens, 2007). 
Table 4: Safe houses 
 Albania Bulgaria Total 
Safe house 10 07 17 
No indication 10 14 24 
 20 21 41 
In more than half of the files, safe houses play an important role. From their pro-
fessional past, former intelligence people can well have the needed contacts to organize 
the smuggling process without too many problems in the areas of transit and of des-
tination. 
For a clarification of the patterns that become apparent in the files, we focus on 
those files that offer enough data to permit an integral analysis of the logistical know-
how, i.e. concretely 10 files, 5 Albanian and 5 Bulgarian ones. There was always some 
information lacking in the other files. For each pattern, we first explain the story in a 
few words. However, to add one important remark: the indications with “Albanian” or 
“Bulgarian” aren’t an indication of ethnic characteristics, but are due to the fact that the 
networks with such a profile in our files are rooted in these countries, very probably 
due to contextual reasons. 
The “individual-infiltration” large-scale human smuggling pattern 
Let us look at a case where 13,000 smuggled clients were transferred by an Al-
banian network through Belgium into England over a two-year period. Two leaders of 
this network seemed, as was written, to have worked till 1977 in the Albanian “intelli-
gence” in the period of Berisha. It was seen in the files that money earned by the smug-
gling went directly to the party of Berisha. The visas were obtained through a person 
with excellent contacts in the Greek Embassy in Albania. The boss, who could conti-
nue to give instructions from a Belgian jail, had previously used a diplomatic passport. 
From the police reports it appears that the Albanian network had achieved a huge de-
gree of professionalism. Some members appeared to be trained in counter-techniques 
against observation. Normally these techniques are taught by persons who work for an 
“intelligence” agency. 
In our case of 13,000 smuggled clients, we observed various transport firms. The 
drivers were contacted and paid throughout the network. It couldn’t be shown that the 
management of the transport firms was informed of the drivers’ involvement in illegal 
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activities. During the transit phase, various functions of the safe houses were revealed 
that could be linked at the transport phase, the component of finances and of stay: con-
trol over the victims, arrangement of the transfer to the next criminal organization, the 
payments and the instruments of pressure applied, links with economic entities, remo-
val of passports, new chances for clients, and adaptations by the network management 
of the transport capacity. The traffickers had absolute control over the behavior of the 
smuggled clients. Violence was not seen as out of line in the safe houses. Further pay-
ments were arranged with various clients/victims at the safe houses. The clients being 
smuggled were forced to phone family members in their country of provenance to put 
them under pressure to pay more money. 
In the various ethnic organizations that were suppliers for the Albanian network, 
the management of a safe house was placed each time in the hands of the traffickers of 
the concerned ethnic organization. For example, the safe house of a collaborating Chi-
nese smuggling organization was managed by two local Chinese snakeheads, one of 
whom also lived in the safe house. That snakehead was part of a social network around 
the smuggling network, and he appeared to own a firm in Belgium and The Nether-
lands. 
The various supplying ethnic organizations also used safe houses in transit coun-
tries such as Russia, the Ukraine, Chechnya, Poland, Italy, France and Germany. Along 
the route, the clients came into touch with various persons who always made a part of 
the journey with them. The migrants were locked up in safe houses in the various coun-
tries and were sometimes also beaten. For example, when arriving in Moscow, the Chi-
nese victims were housed together with other nationalities in safe houses. Their pass-
ports were taken away. They were transferred into the Ukraine where Russian traf-
fickers were expecting them. Then, they were separated per nationality into different 
safe houses. 
This case is an example of a large-scale smuggling network that makes use of 
extremely well-controlled safe houses and of corruptible truck drivers. What is mala 
fide here is the systematic collaboration, under the orders of a criminal organization, or 
of one or more malevolent collaborators of what might be bona fide transport firms. 
One of the leading bosses of the network is an ex-agent of the former Albanian intelli-
gence service who made his expertise and contacts (with embassy personnel) available 
to the criminal network. The level of corruption is an individual one. 
We found this first pattern in 9 Albanian files. In short, we saw a large-scale 
smuggling network that controls its clients/victims very efficiently in the safe houses, 
where violence is frequently used. In this sense, the safe houses in this pattern could be 
called “hell houses” (cfr. Chin, 1997). As for the transport, one looks at mala fide dri-
vers of bona fide transport firms. A central role is played by ex-members of intelli-
gence services, who bring with them their expertise, good knowledge of specific tech-
niques and a lot of contacts where needed. Where it is necessary, corruption is used. 
We call it the “individual-infiltration smuggling” pattern. This pattern has some simila-
rities with the Trade and Development model in the way it is executed, but not in the 
way that the profits are invested at the end, as described in connection with the large-
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scale Chinese smuggling networks that use strict control in an integrated way through-
out the whole network (Shelley, 2003). 
The “structural-infiltration” large-scale human smuggling pattern 
In various cases from Bulgaria and Belgium – situated in the 1995–2000 pe-
riod – our files show an activity cluster carried out by former members of Bulgarian in-
telligence, originally networks for espionage and smuggling and multiple criminality, 
that was oriented at a certain moment to the human smuggling and trafficking market. 
The criminal network had good contacts with a Western embassy in Sofia and obtained 
visas through its travel agencies and transport firms whenever necessary. The clients 
could stay in small hotels. 
In one particular case we saw a mala fide Belgo-Bulgarian travel agency belon-
ging to the family of a former head of the Bulgarian “intelligence”. Till July ’96, tourist 
visas were given in a quasi automatic way to the Belgo-Bulgarian travel agency, with-
out any control by the Belgian foreigner administration in Brussels (Leman, 2002). 
This changed only from 1996 on, when the visas were refused because of a new diplo-
matic secretary at the embassy. One of the persons who had obtained visas in that 
way – that were only refused from 1996 on – appears to have been convicted in Bel-
gium at the end of 1996 – so we learn from a judiciary file – for exploitation of prosti-
tution. Another person was cited in an international judiciary file on the Kurdish PKK 
because of his trade in weapons and child soldiers. Still another person was charged 
with international illegal trafficking of stolen cars near the end of the 1990s. 
Connected to this case is the one of a transport firm that invested in the same pe-
riod in transferring people to Belgium, who had been invited by Belgian firms. In a 
note of the Belgian intelligence service, one can read that that person was “actively res-
ponsible in a firm with connections with the Bulgarian branch of the mafia, well known 
for its violence and supply of false documents, visas and job permits”. The efficiency 
of the criminal system was based on corruption. 
Here we see a mala fide travel agency and transport firm whose management is 
completely under the control of a criminal network. The mala fide character is situated 
here at the level of the firm’s management, where legal and illegal activities are con-
nected with one another. From money laundering operations the management slowly, 
and through diversification, develops into a firm that, while maintaining a legal appea-
rance, tries to exploit the desire of many people to emigrate to or to simply see the 
West, meanwhile organizing a trip to the West for criminals belonging to the organiza-
tion. The corruption here has a structural dimension that reaches into certain Western 
embassies. 
The second pattern, that we see represented in 8 Bulgarian files, can be seen as a 
human smuggling network that organizes transport and tourist trips, using travel 
agencies and transport firms for illegal asylum seekers who stay in small hotels (as 
their safe houses). One uses illegal visa applications (Leman, 2002). It concerns mala 
fide transport firms or travel agencies that are under the control of a criminal organiza-
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tion, but that develop both legal and illegal activities. There is collusion between seg-
ments from the intelligence services and the world of organized crime. This concretizes 
itself in the taking over of firms of the former intelligence members by a criminal 
network. The former intelligence services openly play an entrepreneurship role. This is 
the “structural-infiltration” human smuggling network. 
The “violent-control prostitution” trafficking pattern 
In the literature about Bulgaria, one can learn about the security firm VIS that 
has strong links with former intelligence agents (Nikolov, 1997). A UN study confirms 
that VIS is a Bulgarian criminal organization that is very well integrated into social and 
economic life. Originally it was one of those typical protection firms that was born in 
the period of transition in Bulgaria and recruited intelligence agents (Nikolov, 1997). 
The first ones that were protected by VIS even received a special sticker referring to 
VIS (Nikolov, 1997). 
In one of our files we see the case of a perfect example, where mechanisms of 
protection are at work, and where a new mafia-like organization has been created at the 
moment of the implosion of the communist regime in Bulgaria, recruiting agents of the 
former intelligence agencies. After the initial flight of State capital, and of a host of 
other smuggling activities, girls were brought to Belgium and The Netherlands through 
a travel agency with the objective of entrepreneurship to make new money putting the 
girls into prostitution. Credible sources inform us that the head of the traffic was 
strongly linked with the former Bulgarian intelligence service. The traffickers were 
themselves owners of one of the travel agencies with tourist busses with which they 
transferred the victims for prostitution. The head of the network is a well-known mafia 
member who owns a chain of restaurants, cafés, a pawnshop, a bank and a fleet of taxis. 
He has good contacts with at least ten criminal organizations in Bulgaria, including the 
security firms VIS and SIC. From a witness in this file, it appears that a meeting was 
organized between ten mafia-like organizations in which a number of criminal acti-
vities, including prostitution in the Netherlands and in Belgium, and activities in such 
economic sectors as transport, food service, travel agencies, hotels and car rental were 
discussed and internally divided. When analyzing the case one also sees how some 
officials, both among former Bulgarian authorities and in Western embassies, had 
contacts with people from these groups. 
In this case, the intermingling between the intelligence and criminal network is 
located in the global societal field and focuses on the taking over of typical responsibi-
lities of the authorities, such as providing protection. For the transport of the prostitu-
tion trafficking, the criminal network uses bus companies and travel agencies that it it-
self owns and that are only used for illegal transport. The victims being trafficked for 
prostitution are placed in the country of destination in safe houses, that we call control 
houses. 
In the third pattern, represented in 2 Bulgarian files, we see a prostitution net-
work as a prototype that places its victims in a control house from where the victim is 
brought every day to various prostitution bars. The transport from the country of prove-
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nance takes place through a travel agency or a bus company. It involves mala fide 
travel agencies and bus companies that are under the control of a criminal organization 
predominantly focused on illegal activities. There is collusion between segments of the 
intelligence services and organized crime. This becomes concrete, for example, in ta-
king over typical authority responsibilities such as protection by the criminal network 
through security companies. The corruption is structural and is situated at the level of 
officials. We call it a Violent-control prostitution-trafficking model. 
This profile shows some similarity with the Violent entrepreneur model, that 
seems to be typical for the Balkan crime groups that are active in trafficking of women, 
and it shows the strong implication of some officials in the country of provenance and 
sometimes also in a Western embassy (Shelley, 2003). 
The three business patterns 























Malevolent individual mix of legal and illegal 
activities 
illegal activities 
Transport truck drivers travel agency  
transport firm 
travel agency + bus 
company 
Safe house hell house small hotel control house 





We see pattern 1 in 9 Albanian dossiers (that represent 5 networks), profile 2 in 
8 Bulgarian dossiers (that represent 4 networks), and profile 3 in 2 Bulgarian dossiers 
(representing 1 network). The other, less complete files, with a less complete view of 
the logistical environment of the networks, seem largely to tend in the direction of one 
of these described profiles. 
Concluding remarks 
We distinguished three patterns, representing 20 of the 41 files from Albania 
and Bulgaria. The 21 files that are not discussed don't permit a complete profile ana-
lysis, as they are incomplete. We only constructed those patterns for which we could 
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find all the necessary data in the files. When we tried to situate the 21 incomplete files, 
they seemed to tend in the direction of the described profiles. The patterns were also 
confirmed by police officers with whom we discussed them. As a conclusion, we think 
that they can more or less be generalized for the current practices in that business. 
When looking at the difference between patterns 2 and 3, we suggest a second 
conclusion, namely concerning the difference between human smuggling and human 
trafficking. The official definitions given in the UN protocol state: “Smuggling of 
migrants shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a finan-
cial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which 
the person is not a national or permanent resident. (….) This becomes trafficking if 
there is exploitation, which shall include sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UN, 2000a). 
We could perhaps add some qualification. Various studies have shown that human 
smuggling can well degenerate into human trafficking (Meese et al., 1998, cited in Salt, 
2000: 22). At least in our files, we note there is a grey area between human smuggling 
and human trafficking. Some large-scale human smuggling networks clearly also invest 
in human trafficking, or smuggling activities can shift in the direction of human 
trafficking in some of their safe houses. 
A final observation concerns the fact that the managers of the logistic ecology 
can very often remain unpunished. In our files, not one driver, not one manager of a 
travel agency nor of a transport firm, and not one owner of a safe house was punished 
when the cases were brought to court. Apparently, the system itself can remain intact. 
Almost always, it is only the most “visible” (and easily replaceable) actors that are con-
demned and put in jail. 
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ANALIZA NEKIH VISOKO STRUKTURIRANIH MREŽA KRIJUMČARENJA 
LJUDI I TRGOVANJA LJUDIMA IZ ALBANIJE I BUGARSKE U BELGIJU 
SAŽETAK 
Autori istražuju logističku ekologiju 30 opsežnih (masovnih) mreža koje su sudjelovale u 
krijumčarenju ljudi i trgovanju ljudima iz Albanije i Bugarske u Belgiju (1995–2003). Detaljnije je is-
traženo deset mreža kako bi se odredila tri konačna profila mreža na temelju uporabe strukturnih i 
operativnih posredničkih struktura. One su nazvane obrascem »individualne infiltracije« i »strukturne 
infiltracije« krijumčarenja ljudima te obrascem trgovanja »nasilno kontroliranom prostitucijom«. 
Valja primijetiti da je biznis organiziran na taj način da organizatori logističke podrške nikad nisu 
optuženi. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: krijumčarenje ljudi, trgovanje ljudima, posredničke strukture 
Johan Leman, Stef Janssens 
ANALYSE DE CERTAINS RÉSEAUX HAUTEMENT STRUCTURÉS DE 
TRAFIC ET DE TRAITE D'ÊTRES HUMAINS DE L'ALBANIE ET DE LA 
BULGARIE VERS LA BELGIQUE 
RÉSUMÉ 
Les auteurs examinent l’écologie logistique de 30 grands réseaux qui étaient actifs dans le trafic 
et la traite d’êtres humains d’Albanie et de Bulgarie vers la Belgique (1995–2003). Dix réseaux ont 
été étudiés de façon détaillée pour aboutir à dégager trois profils de réseaux, basés sur leur utilisation 
des structures intermédiaires structurelles et opérationnelles. Ils se définissent en deux modèles de ré-
seaux de trafic, de type « infiltration individuelle » et « infiltration structurelle », et un modèle de ré-
seau de traite de type « contrôle violent – prostitution ». Il faut noter que leurs affaires sont organisées 
de manière que les organisateurs du support logistique ne sont jamais inculpés. 
MOTS CLÉS : trafic d’êtres humains, traite, structures intermédiaires 
